Third Party Consent-Darren Chaker

Darren Chaker

It is only when the objector has superior possessory rights that he can override the third party‟s consent. See U.S. v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Morales, 861 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Esparaza, 162 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 1998) (police may not rely on third party’s consent to intentionally bypass a person who is present, has a superior privacy interest in the premises, and actively objects to the search.)
Most frequently relationship issues come into play when dealing with overriding consent. In Mitchell v. State, 558 So.2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), the warrantless search of marital home and resultant seizure of cocaine and paraphernalia was illegal, although wife called police to home and told them where they could find cocaine belonging to defendant, where defendant was present and objected to warrantless search of home.

© 2011 Darren Chaker. All Rights Reserved.

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